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BUSH V. GORE AT THE DAWNING OF THE AGE OF OBAMA 
Nelson Lund* 
INTRODUCTION 
As Akhil Amar reminds us, hundreds of law professors denounced the 
Bush v. Gore majority as propagandists who suppressed the facts and used 
their power “to act as political partisans, not judges of a court of law”; as 
he also notes, a few other law professors leveled similar judgments against 
the Florida judges whose decision triggered the U.S. Supreme Court’s 
review.1 Professor Amar does not openly endorse the most venomous 
accusations leveled against the Bush v. Gore majority, but he does attempt 
to show that the actions of the Florida judges “in general were legally 
defensible, and often quite admirable.”2 He also maintains that “the U.S. 
Supremes,” as he repeatedly calls them, had no legal basis for their 
decision and that three of them strategically joined an opinion that even 
they probably regarded as “implausible.”3 
If one knew only what Professor Amar tells us, it would be hard to 
resist the conclusions reached by two vitriolic professors whom he quotes 
at length: “[F]ive Republican members of the Court decided the case in a 
way that is recognizably nothing more than a naked expression of these 
justices’ preference for the Republican Party . . . [T]he court gave no 
legally valid reason for [its] act of usurpation.”4  
Fortunately, the legal professoriate is not an Athenian jury, with the 
power to ostracize disfavored officials. These pundits are but self-
appointed prosecutors in the court of public opinion. In that court, as 
Professor Amar says, “Facts matter.”5 Or at least they should. And when 
one looks at the facts, Professor Amar’s legal case collapses. 
In the space allotted for my response, I will discuss a few of the most 
significant omissions, errors, and rhetorical misdirections in Professor 
Amar’s passionate assault on the Supreme Court.6 Nothing I say in this 
                                                                                                                     
 * Patrick Henry Professor of Constitutional Law and the Second Amendment, George 
Mason University School of Law. George Mason provided research support, a portion of which 
came through its Law & Economics Center. For helpful comments, I am grateful to Stephen G. 
Gilles, Mara S. Lund, and John O. McGinnis. 
 1. Akhil Reed Amar, Bush, Gore, Florida, and the Constitution, 61 FLA. L. REV. 945, 947–
50 (2009). 
 2. Id. at 955.  
 3. Id. at 966. 
 4. Id. at 947–48 (quoting Margaret Jane Radin and Bruce Ackerman, respectively). 
 5. Id. at 963. 
 6. More extensive treatments of the issues discussed in this response are available in Nelson 
Lund, The Unbearable Rightness of Bush v. Gore, 23 CARDOZO L. REV. 1219 (2002) [hereinafter 
Unbearable Rightness]; Nelson Lund, “Equal Protection, My Ass!?”  Bush v. Gore and Laurence 
Tribe’s Hall of Mirrors, 19 CONST. COMMENT. 543 (2002) [hereinafter Hall of Mirrors]; Nelson 
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response is novel—it has all been on the public record for many years. 
SOME OMITTED FACTS ABOUT THE CASE 
Before considering Professor Amar’s argument, the reader needs an 
accurate summary of the Court’s decision. Based on two separate machine 
counts of the Florida ballots, George Bush narrowly won that state’s 
electoral votes.7 Al Gore demanded hand recounts in a few heavily 
Democratic counties, where he could expect to pick up votes as the result 
of the random errors that inevitably occur whenever large numbers of 
ballots are counted.8 State statutes created obstacles to this strategy, but the 
Florida Supreme Court swept those obstacles aside, apparently relying on 
Florida constitutional law.9 In Bush v. Palm Beach County Canvassing 
Board,10 the U.S. Supreme Court unanimously vacated that decision, and 
warned the Florida judges that their decision seemed to conflict with 
McPherson v. Blacker,11 which had interpreted Article II of the U.S. 
Constitution to preclude state constitutions from abridging the discretion of 
state legislatures to specify the manner of choosing presidential electors.12 
The Florida Supreme Court ignored this warning. By a vote of four to 
three, these judges ratified Gore’s cherry-picking strategy, created more 
time for recounts to be conducted, and definitively awarded Gore a number 
of additional votes from the counties he had selected.13 This included 
additional votes based on a p rtial recount in Miami-Dade County that had 
begun with heavily Democratic precincts and stopped before it reached the 
more Republican precincts.14 The Florida Supreme Court also ordered a 
recount of some additional ballots in Miami-Dade County, but only the so-
called undervote ballots that Gore wanted to have recounted.15 The Florida 
Supreme Court also ordered a state-wide hand recount (which Gore had 
not requested), but not a recount of all the ballots, or even a recount of all 
the ballots that had been rejected as invalid in the initial machine counts; 
                                                                                                                     
Lund, Carnival of Mirrors: Laurence Tribe’s “Unbearable Wrongness,’ 19 CONST. COMMENT. 609 
(2002) [hereinafter Carnival of Mirrors].  
 7. Lund, Unbearable Rightness, upra note 6, at 1228. 
 8. Id. at 1228–29. 
 9. Id. at 1229–33; Palm Beach County Canvassing Bd. v. Harris, 772 So. 2d 1220 (Fla. 
2000). 
 10. 531 U.S. 70 (2000). 
 11. 146 U.S. 1 (1892). 
 12. Id. at 25; Bush v. Palm Beach Canvassing Bd., 531 U.S. at 76–77. 
 13. Gore v. Harris, 772 So. 2d 1243 (Fla. 2000); Lund, Unbearable Rightness, upra note 6, 
at 1235–37. 
 14. Lund, Hall of Mirrors, supra note 6, at 554 & n.40; Lund, Unbearable Rightness, upra 
note 6, at 1239–40 & n. 68. 
 15. “Undervotes” are ballots on which the machine detects no vote for a particular office; 
“overvotes” are ballots on which the machine detects a vote for more than one candidate, and 
therefore does not register any vote for that office. Lund, Unbearable Rightness, upra note 6, at 
1241; Lund, Hall of Mirrors, supra note 6, at 546 n.10. 
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the only ballots that would be reviewed were those resembling the ballots 
Gore asked to have recounted in Miami-Dade County.16 The Florida court, 
moreover, provided no standards to be used by the officials charged with 
reexamining these selected ballots, and no uniform standard was in fact 
adopted.17 
In Bush v. Gore, the Supreme Court held that this partial recount of the 
ballots violated the Equal Protection Clause18 as interpreted in a line of 
vote-dilution cases beginning with Reynolds v. Sims,19 and remanded the 
case to the Florida Supreme Court “for further proceedings not inconsistent 
with this opinion.”20 
THE FIRST EQUAL PROTECTION CANARD 
Professor Amar maintains that the initial machine counts, which the 
Florida Supreme Court invalidated, were infected with much more serious 
“inequalities and inaccuracies and disenfranchisements” than the partial 
and selective hand recount at issue in Bush v. Gore.21 Professor Amar 
falsely claims, based on an incomplete and misleading quotation from the 
Bush v. Gore opinion, that the only problem with the Florida recount was 
that “some dimpled chads were being treated as valid votes, others not.”22 
Professor Amar may think that the Supreme Court majority was just 
“fixating on the small glitches of the recount”23 when it rejected the biased 
and partial recount described above. But three out of seven Florida 
Supreme Court Justices (all Democrats) thought otherwise.24 You didn’t 
need to be a Republican or a Bush supporter to recognize that this kind of 
recount had “no foundation in the law of Florida,”25 or to conclude that the 
partial recount ordered by the Florida majority “would violate other voters’ 
[federal] rights to due process and equal protection of the law.”26 
Professor Amar claims that these “small glitches” or “picayune 
discrepancies” paled in comparison with the unfairness of the initial 
machine counts of the ballots.27 And why were these counts unfair? The 
                                                                                                                     
 16. Lund, Unbearable Rightness, upra note 6, at 1237; Bush v. Gore, 531 U.S. 98, 101 
(2000). 
 17. For more details about the facts and rulings summarized in this paragraph and the 
preceding paragraph, see Lund, Unbearable Rightness, upra note 6, at 1235–43; Lund, Hall of 
Mirrors, supra note 6, at 548–56; Lund, Carnival of Mirrors, supra note 6, at 612–13. 
 18. Bush v. Gore, 531 U.S. at 103. 
 19. 377 U.S. 533 (1964). 
 20. Bush v. Gore, 531 U.S. at 111. 
 21. Amar, supra note 1, at 961–63. 
 22. Amar, supra note 1, at 961. 
 23. Amar, supra note 1, at 964. 
 24. Gore v. Harris, 772 So. 2d 1243 (Fla. 2000). 
 25. Id. at 1263 (Wells, C.J., dissenting). 
 26. Id. at 1272 (Harding, J., dissenting). 
 27. Amar, supra note 1, at 964. 
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only specific problem he identifies is that “black precincts in 2000 
typically had much glitchier voting machines, which generated undercounts 
many times the rate of wealthier (white) precincts with sleek voting 
technology.”28 His only evidence is a citation to an essay written by one of 
Gore’s lawyers after he lost his case, which offers a mere assertion that was 
never tested through the adversarial process.29 Even assuming that 
Professor Amar’s vague and unproven allegation is true, is he right to say 
that the Supreme Court “piously attribut[ed] the problems to ‘voter error’ 
(as opposed to outdated and seriously flawed machines)”?30 Why couldn’t 
one just as easily maintain that Professor Amar piously blames the 
machines for (certain) voters’ failure to follow the instructions? Justice 
O’Connor made such a suggestion at oral argument: “Well, why isn’t the 
[appropriate] standard the one that voters are instructed to follow, for 
goodness sakes? I mean, it couldn’t be clearer . . . .”31 
Let us leave aside the obvious differences between discrepancies that 
inevitably arise in a decentralized election system like Florida’s and those 
resulting from a recount system devised after the winner of the initial 
machine counts has been determined.32 Even on the far-fetched assumption 
that there was more “unfairness” or “inequality” in the initial machine 
counts than in the challenged recount, how could the Supreme Court have 
known about it? Vice President Gore made no such allegation in his 
lawsuit.33 No evidence of such inequality was presented to the trial court, 
or to any of the appellate courts that reviewed the case. None of the 
dissenting Justices on the U.S. Supreme Court made any such claim.34 Was 
                                                                                                                     
 28. Id. at 964. Such a racially disparate impact, assuming that it actually existed, has no 
apparent legal significance. See, e.g., Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S. 229, 248 (1976) (rejecting 
disparate impact analysis under the Equal Protection Clause). Cf. Amar, supra note 1, at 969 
(expressing concern about the disenfranchisement of felons, “who are disproportionately persons of 
color”); Michael D. Goldhaber, The Felon Vote: Millions of Prisoners and Ex-Cons Have Lost the 
Ballot, but Suits Could Change That, 23 NAT’L L.J., Oct. 30, 2000, at A1 (discussing study 
estimating that 70% to 90% of enfranchised felons would vote Democratic). 
 29. Amar, supra note 1, at 964 n.61. For an illuminating example of the importance of testing 
factual allegations through the adversarial process, taken from the Bus  v. Gore litigation itself, see 
the devastating cross-examination of a Yale professor, Nicholas Hengartner, who served as one of 
Gore’s expert witnesses. Contest Trial Transcript, Vol. II, at 192–230, 233–74, Gore v. Harris, 772 
So. 2d 1243 (Fla. Leon County Ct. 2000) (No. 00-2808), available at 
http://election2000.stanford.edu/CV-00-2808-33.pdf. 
 30. Amar, supra note 1, at 964. 
 31. Transcript of Oral Argument at 58, Bush v. Gore, 531 U.S. 98 (2000) (No. 00-949), 
available at 2000 WL 1804429. 
 32. For further discussion, see Lund, Hall of Mirrors, supra note 6, at 552–62; Lund, 
Unbearable Rightness, upra note 6, at 1235–36, 1268. Professor Amar also suggests that Bush v. 
Gore made the preposterous assumption that “the Constitution requires absolute perfection and 
uniformity of standards in counting and/or recounting.” Amar, supra note 1, at 962. The Court did 
no such thing. See Lund, Carnival of Mirrors, supra note 6, at 611–12. 
 33. Lund, Carnival of Mirrors, supra note 6, at 613 & n.23. 
 34. For further detail, see id.; Lund, Hall of Mirrors, supra note 6, at 559. 
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the Supreme Court really expected (or even permitted) to take judicial 
notice of facts that were not argued or proved, and that Professor Amar 
himself has not tried to prove nine years later? On this critical point, 
Professor Amar’s case against Bush v. Gore does not simply dissolve, it 
boomerangs. 
THE SECOND EQUAL PROTECTION CANARD 
Professor Amar also maintains that the Supreme Court “failed to cite a 
single case that, on its facts, came close to supporting the majority’s 
analysis and result.”35 It is true that there were no previous cases with 
similar facts. How could there have been? No legislature or court had ever 
devised a way of counting votes that remotely resembled the arbitrary and 
biased procedures adopted by the Florida Supreme Court. 
Bush v. Gore’s equal protection holding was in fact supported by a 
large body of well-established precedent, beginning with Reynolds v. 
Sims,36 where the Court clearly stated: “Weighting the votes of citizens 
differently, by any method or means, merely because of where they happen 
to reside, hardly seems justifiable. One must be ever aware that the 
Constitution forbids ‘sophisticated as well as simpleminded modes of 
discrimination.’”37 The Florida Supreme Court devised an extremely 
complex system of weighting, in which certain kinds of ballots were more 
likely to be counted as legal votes in some places than in others, thus 
discriminating for and against different groups of voters based on where 
they happened to reside.38 
Most obviously, voters who cast “overvote” ballots in the heavily 
Democratic counties Gore selected for recounts were treated more 
favorably than those who cast similar ballots elsewhere.39 Similarly, voters 
living in the un-recounted (and more Republican) precincts of Miami-Dade 
were disadvantaged in comparison with those living in the recounted (and 
more Democratic) precincts.40 The complexity of the vote dilution 
involved did not convert it into something other than vote dilution. 
Not a single one of the dissenters in Bush v. Gore argued that the 
Florida recount comported with the Court’s equal protection precedents,41 
and Professor Amar understandably does not try to do so either. Better just 
to hope the reader will accept on faith the accuracy of epithets like “new-
                                                                                                                     
 35. Amar, supra note 1, at 963. 
 36. 377 U.S. 533 (1964). 
 37. Id. at 563 (emphasis added). For discussions of the case law, see Lund, Hall of Mirrors, 
supra note 6, at 548–56; Lund, Unbearable Rightness, upra note 6, at 1244–51. 
 38. For a detailed discussion, see Lund, Unbearable Rightness, upra, note 6, at 1237–52. 
 39. See id. at 1241–42. 
 40. See id. at 1239–40. 
 41. Bush v. Gore, 531 U.S. 98, 123–58 (2000) (separate dissenting opinions of Stevens, 
Souter, Ginsburg, Breyer, JJ.). 
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minted” and “absurdly ad hoc” to describe the Court’s holding.42 
THE NARROW HOLDING CANARD 
Professor Amar writes: “The Rehnquist Court claimed that its new-
minted equality principles applied only to judicially supervised state 
recounts, and not necessarily to other aspects of the electoral system. But 
the Court gave no principled reason for this absurdly ad hoc limitation.”43 
This is false. The Court rested its decision on well-established principles 
from previous decisions,44 and never said these principles would not apply 
in future cases. The Court did say, quite prudently and responsibly, that 
“our consideration is limited to the present circumstances, for the problem 
of equal protection in election processes generally presents many 
complexities.”45 This was no more “absurdly ad hoc” than the Court’s 
equally prudent decision to limit its consideration in Brown v. Board of 
Education46 to the issue of segregation in public education. The Brown 
Court did not say that its principles were inapplicable elsewhere,  and 
neither did Bush v. Gore.47 
THE ‘STOP COUNTING’  CANARD 
Professor Amar insinuates that “the U.S. Supremes felt they had to stop 
the recount altogether, rather than remand once again to judges whom they 
had come to view as judicial cheats.”48 Leaving aside the unsubstantiated 
charge that some members of the Court viewed the Florida judges as 
dishonest, this is a fictionalized report of the Court’s remedial order. 
The Supreme Court did remand the case to the Florida judges, and the 
Court did leave these judges legally free to conduct a recount conforming 
to the principles of Reynolds v. Sims49 and its progeny.50 The only legal bar 
to such a recount was the Florida Supreme Court’s own prior 
determination that state law required a recount to be concluded by 
December 12 (the same day that Bush v. Gore was decided).51 The Florida 
Supreme Court would have been free to overturn that determination on 
remand.52 
 
                                                                                                                     
 42. Amar, supra note 1, at 962. 
 43. Amar, supra note 1, at 962. 
 44. Bush v. Gore, 531 U.S. at 104–10 (majority opinion). 
 45. Id. at 109. 
 46. 347 U.S. 483 (1954). 
 47. See Lund, Unbearable Rightness, upra note 6, at 1267–69. 
 48. Amar, supra note 1, at 950. 
 49. 377 U.S. 533 (1964). 
 50. Bush v. Gore, 531 U.S. at 111. 
 51. Id. at 110; Lund, Unbearable Rightness, upra note 6, at 1274–78. 
 52. See Lund, Carnival of Mirrors, supra note 6, at 614–16; Lund, Unbearable Rightness, 
supra note 6, at 1270–78. 
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Professor Amar may not recognize this, but Al Gore did. Two of Gore’s 
lawyers have publicly acknowledged that Bush v. Gore permitted them to 
seek a new recount, and they even stayed up all night on December 12 
writing a brief that invited the Florida Supreme Court to conduct one.53 
Gore decided to concede the election instead, perhaps because he 
recognized what the dissenting judges on the Florida Supreme Court found 
obvious: it would have been logistically impossible to conduct such a 
recount and provide for meaningful judicial review in the six days 
remaining before the federal deadline.54 Whatever Gore’s reason for 
conceding, it was not because the Supreme Court had “stopped” the 
Florida Supreme Court from conducting a new recount. 
THE FIRST ARTICLE II  RED HERRING 
A substantial part of Professor Amar’s lecture is devoted to attacking 
the argument that the Florida Supreme Court violated Article II of the 
Constitution, which commands that presidential electors be chosen as state 
legislatures (not state courts or state constitutions) may direct.55 The 
majority opinion in Bush v. Gore made no reference to this argument, so its 
validity vel non has no bearing on the merits of the Court’s decision.  
However, it is relevant to Professor Amar’s argument for two reasons. 
First, he suggests that three concurring Justices (Republicans all), who 
endorsed both this argument and the Court’s equal protection argument, 
were engaged in disingenuous strategic voting.56 Second, he argues that the 
Florida judges clearly did not violate Article II, and should not even be 
suspected of any improper behavior.57 
The strategic voting charge against Justices Rehnquist, Scalia, and 
Thomas rests on two claims: (1) that these three Justices had previously 
adopted an equal protection approach that “ran counter” to the approach in 
the Bush v. Gore majority opinion, and (2) that principled originalists must 
have had “special problems” with the majority opinion.58 Accordingly, the 
Republican trio probably saw the majority opinion they joined as “highly 
problematic and implausible.”59 
Professor Amar does not provide a single example of an opinion by 
Justices Rehnquist, Scalia, or Thomas that “ran counter” to the Bush v. 
Gore majority opinion, and I know of none.60 Regarding the second claim, 
                                                                                                                     
 53. See Lund, Carnival of Mirrors, supra note 6, at 615 & n.32. 
 54. The Electoral College was required to meet on December 18. 3 U.S.C. § 7 (2006). A 
somewhat similar recount case—the 2008 Coleman-Franken senatorial contest—took eight months 
to resolve. 
 55. Amar, supra note 1, at 957–60. 
 56. Amar, supra note 1, at 965–66. 
 57. Amar, supra note 1, at 953–56. 
 58. Amar, supra note 1, at 965. 
 59. Amar, supra note 1, at 966. 
 60. A related version of Professor Amar’s unsupported accusation is debunked in Lund, Hall 
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it is true that there are serious originalist objections to the Court’s 
Fourteenth Amendment voting rights jurisprudence, which Justice Harlan 
powerfully articulated at the outset.61 But no Supreme Court Justice in our 
history has ever advocated the overruling of all cases that rest on 
objectionable precedential foundations, especially when none of the 
litigants has asked for a precedent to be reconsidered. Not Chief Justice 
Rehnquist, not Justice Scalia, not Justice Thomas, not anybody. In order to 
find an inconsistency in what these three Justices did in Bush v. Gore, you 
have to caricature them. 
As to the behavior of the Florida majority, Professor Amar admits it 
was “a momentous mistake”62 to ignore the constitutional issue raised by 
the Supreme Court in Bush I, but he excuses the mistake on the ground that 
time was short and the Florida majority nevertheless “did the right legal 
things and for the right legal reasons.”63 How so? According to Professor 
Amar, they “intuitively” saw the case in light of a “larger spirit.”64  
Let us leave aside the fact that the U.S. Supreme Court declared such 
“larger spirits” inapplicable over a century ago, in a case that the Court 
unanimously told the Florida judges to consider.65 And let us accept, 
arguendo, the radical assumption that appellate judges may properly 
“intuit” (or guess at, or stumble on) correct legal conclusions. Even on 
these generous assumptions, is Professor Amar right to be so sure that the 
Florida majority’s “intuitions” were correct? 
In support of these intuitions, he offers his own extended legal analysis, 
which he describes as “crisp and cogent.”66 This argument—essentially 
replicating a reasonably crisp portion of Justice Ginsburg’s Bush v. Gore 
dissent—is that state election statutes are generally taken to mean whatever 
state courts interpret them to mean, and that Florida’s legislature has never 
said a different presumption should operate when the statutes are applied in 
presidential elections.67 The argument is certainly colorable,68 but how 
“cogent” is it? Florida’s own Chief Justice (a Democrat) unequivocally 
concluded, on the basis of longstanding precedent, that his court’s majority 
had violated Article II.69 Furthermore, Chief Justice Rehnquist’s 
                                                                                                                     
of Mirrors, supra note 6, at 548–50. 
 61. See Lund, Carnival of Mirrors, supra note 6, at 610; Lund, Hall of Mirrors, supra note 6, 
at 556–61; Lund, Unbearable Rightness, upra note 6, at 1262 & n.142. 
 62. Amar, supra note 1, at 953. 
 63. Amar, supra note 1, at 956. 
 64. Amar, supra note 1, at 956. 
 65. Bush v. Palm Beach County Canvassing Bd., 531 U.S. 70, 76–77 (2000) (discussing 
McPherson v. Blacker, 146 U.S. 1, 25 (1892)). 
 66. Amar, supra note 1, at 953–55. 
 67. See Bush v. Gore, 531 U.S. 98, 135–43 (2000) (Ginsburg, J., dissenting). 
 68. See Lund, Unbearable Rightness, upra note 6, at 1233. 
 69. Gore v. Harris, 772 So. 2d 1243, 1268 (Fla. 2000) (Wells, C.J., dissenting). Professor 
Amar misleadingly reports that Chief Justice Wells “worried aloud about the Article II issue.” 
Amar, supra note 1, at 952. He did a lot more than worry aloud. 
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concurrence in Bush v. Gore offered detailed arguments in support of that 
conclusion.70 Apparently, we are just expected to “intuit” that these 
arguments are so obviously wrong that they need not even be addressed. 
In a small red herring within the larger red herring of his arguments 
about Article II, Professor Amar encourages such intuitions by attacking 
Katherine Harris, an elected officeholder whose job required her to 
interpret Florida’s election laws.71 Professor Amar claims that she “showed 
dubious legal judgment” by participating in Bush’s 2000 election campaign 
(though he does not say what law she may have violated), and claims that 
her official interpretations of the Florida election statutes “raised a vivid 
specter of severe partisanship.”72 They were based, he implies, on 
“bureaucratic mumbo jumbo or statutory legalese”73 rather than a “deep 
constitutional principle” that Professor Amar has himself intuited.74 In 
support, he notes that the supposedly more expert Florida Attorney 
General’s office had resolved at least one statutory issue differently than 
Harris did.75 
Before swallowing this story, one should consider a couple of facts that 
Professor Amar omits. Alas, the Florida Attorney General used the same 
“dubious legal judgment,” if that is what it was, by serving as co-chairman 
of Al Gore’s 2000 Florida election campaign.76 What’s more, even this 
active Gore supporter gave an early warning that a recount like the one 
eventually struck down in Bush v. Gore “will incur a legal jeopardy, under 
both the U.S. and State constitutions.”77 So maybe the specter of Harris’ 
“severe partisanship” wasn’t so vivid after all.78 Or perhaps it just seemed 
vivid to those who can perceive specters of partisanship only in 
Republicans. 
THE SECOND ARTICLE II  RED HERRING 
Professor Amar devotes another lengthy section of his lecture to 
arguing that the Florida Legislature had no authority under Article II to 
appoint a slate of electors in response to the uncertainty and delay created 
by the ongoing recount litigation.79 No such appointment occurred, and the 
                                                                                                                     
 70. Bush v. Gore, 531 U.S. at 112–15 (Rehnquist, C.J., concurring). 
 71. Amar, supra note 1, at 957. 
 72. Amar, supra note 1, at 957. 
 73. Amar, supra note 1, at 957. 
 74. Amar, supra note 1, at 957. 
 75. Amar, supra note 1, at 957. 
 76. Don Van Natta Jr., Palm Beach Panel Votes to Proceed on Count, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 15, 
2000, at A1.  
 77. Lund, Unbearable Rightness, upra note 6, at 1245–46 n.91 (quoting Letter from Robert 
A. Butterworth, Attorney Gen., to Honorable Charles E. Burton, Chair, Palm Beach Canvassing 
Board (Nov. 14, 2000)). 
 78. Amar, supra note 1, at 957. 
 79. Amar, supra note 1, at 957–60. 
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issue has absolutely nothing to do with the Court’s decision in Bush v. 
Gore. 
Besides being a distraction, Professor Amar’s analysis is one-sided and 
simplistic. There are obvious arguments to be made on both sides of the 
question,80 and additional arguments might have been developed had the 
question ever been litigated. Professor Amar also fails to acknowledge that 
the Florida Legislature had good practical reasons for contemplating direct 
appointment of an electoral slate.  Federal law required the Electoral 
College to meet on December 18,81 and the State of Florida could have lost 
its right to participate in electing the President if electors had not been 
appointed by then. The Florida Supreme Court, moreover, had found an 
even earlier deadline (December 12) in Florida law,82 and that deadline 
was rapidly approaching when some Florida legislators began to consider 
direct appointment of electors.83 The pressure of time—invoked to excuse 
what Professor Amar concedes was “a momentous mistake” by the Florida 
Supreme Court84—somehow is forgotten when evaluating what legislators 
merely considered doing if time actually ran out. 
CONCLUSION 
Professor Amar is a highly skilled rhetorician. In this very short 
response, I have only touched on some of the more beguiling 
misstatements, omissions, and distractors in his lecture. I do not expect to 
persuade those who are consumed with disdain for Republicans, or Bush, 
or “conservative” judges. But perhaps there is another audience, more 
thoughtful and disciplined than the hippies called to mind by Professor 
Amar’s apparent allusion to the 1960s musical H ir, with its celebration of 
the Age of Aquarius.85 As we stand here at what Professor Amar calls “the 
dawning of the Age of Obama,”86 there are many students and lawyers who 
have encountered snippets of Bush v. Gore in a case book, along with 
editorial comments from professors who have publicly excoriated the 
Court and its decision. Perhaps some of these readers can be moved to take 
a closer, and unprejudiced, look at the facts. They will find a story that 
bears almost no resemblance to the one told by Professor Amar. 
 
                                                                                                                     
 80. For a brief summary of arguments on both sides, see Lund, Unbearable Rightness, upra 
note 6, at 1272–73 & n.167. 
 81. 3 U.S.C. § 7 (2006). 
 82. Palm Beach County Canvassing Bd. v. Harris, 772 So. 2d 1273, 1286 n.17, 1290 n.22 
(Fla. 2000); Gore v. Harris, 772 So. 2d 1243, 1268 & n.30 (Fla. 2000) (Wells, C.J., dissenting); id. 
at 1272 (Harding, J., dissenting). 
 83. For further detail, see Lund, Unbearable Rightness, upra note 6, at 1274–75. 
 84. Amar, supra note 1, at 953. 
 85. The most famous song in this play, which became a hit for the Fifth Dimension, features a 
ringing prophecy: “This is the dawning of the Age of Aquarius . . . .” 
 86. Amar, supra note 1, at 968. 
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